

P 060103Z
FM SSO DIA
TO AFSSO USAF
CIA
NSA
INFO AFSSO TAC
SSO SAC
SSO CINCLANT
EZ1:
ZEM

Cuba

~~11/NO Object~~
~~SM, BK, JS~~

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ UMBRA DIN-2 02377 MAR 76.

EZ2:
USAF FOR IN; CIA FOR CCI; NSA FOR G64; TAC FOR IN; SAC FOR IN; CINCLANT
FOR IN.

SUBJECT: SOVIET PILOTS IN CUBA.

REF: USAF MSG 052025Z MAR 76.

1. WE AGREE THAT THE RECENTLY REPORTED INCREASE IN SOVIET PILOTS IN
CUBA

BEARS CLOSE SCRUTINY, WHILE THE DEVELOPMENTS LISTED IN YOUR MESSAGE ARE
VALID, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT AN OPERATIONAL
SOVIET UNIT IS IN CUBA OR THAT ALL OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS REPRESENT A
NEW

DIMENSION IN SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY TIES, THE "L" MODEL MIG-21 AND THE
RECENTLY IDENTIFIED SA-3 EQUIPMENT ARE VIEWED AS CONSISTENT WITH THE
GRADUAL CUBAN MODERNIZATION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, THE TU-95 ACTIVITY
OF LATE WAS PROBABLY RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA AND THE MID-
ATLANTIC RATHER THAN TO CUBA, PER SE, THE TWENTY REPORTED SOVIET
PILOTS IS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS NORMS, BUT THERE IS
AS YET NO CONFIRMATION THAT THESE PILOTS ARE PART OF A SOVIET UNIT.
2. ALTHOUGH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET PILOTS MAY BE REPLACEMENTS
FOR AN EXPANDED CUBAN EFFORT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS MERIT, WE CANNOT
YET CONFIRM THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CUBAN SUPPORT TO OTHER INSURGENT
ELEMENTS IN THE REGION. DESPITE ALL OF THE ABOVE, WE WILL RECONTACT
APPROPRIATE ANALYSTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND PUBLISH OUR
FINDINGS IN THE PROPER CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT.

XGDS-2

#3673

NNNN

NNDD

P 000103Z MAR 76

FM SSD DIA
TO AFSSD USAF
CIA
NSA

INFO AFSSD TAC
SSD SAC
SSD CINCLANT
EZ1:
ZEN

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